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Samuel Zell, the Chicago Tribune, and the
Emergence of the S ESOP: Understanding the
Tax Advantages and Disadvantages of S ESOPs
MICHAEL S. KNOLL *
I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2007, Samuel Zell acquired the Chicago Tribune Company
(Tribune) using a little-known type of Employee Stock Ownership Plan
(ESOP). In a complicated transaction, which took nearly a year to complete,
the Tribune converted from a subchapter C corporation to a subchapter
S corporation, established an ESOP that purchased 100 percent of the
company’s equity, and sold Zell a call option giving him the right to
purchase forty percent of the company’s equity. 1 Less than a year after Zell
completed his acquisition of the Tribune, the Tribune filed for bankruptcy, a
victim of the recession, declining newspaper advertising revenues, and the
Tribune’s debt-laden capital structure. 2
Outside of bankruptcy, ESOPs are rarely in the news. Only when they
have a connection to a high-profile corporate bankruptcy—most notably the
bankruptcies of United Airlines, Enron, Polaroid, and now the Tribune—do
ESOPs grab the headlines. 3 One reason for the lack of attention paid to
ESOPs might be that both liberals and conservatives generally support
ESOPs as a way of encouraging an “ownership society.” Yet in spite of their
low profile, ESOPs have a large presence in the U.S. economy.
According to the National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO), as
of February 2008, there were 9,774 ESOPs with total assets in excess of $928
billion. 4 Those ESOPs covered 11.2 million employees 5 —one out of every
twelve private sector employees in the United States, and roughly half of all
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1 Bill McIntyre, The Tribune Company ESOP, OWNERS AT WORK, Summer 2007, at
8 (OWNERS AT WORK is published by the Ohio Employee Ownership Center at Kent State
University).
2 Phil Rosenthal & Michael Oneal, Tribune Co. Files for Bankruptcy Protection,
CHI. TRIB. REDEYE EDITION, Dec. 9, 2008, at 8.
3 See Susan Chandler et al., An ESOP Surely; Zell’s Probably; Chicago Billionaire
Said to Have Edge as Tribune Choice Nears, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 1, 2007, at C1.
4 NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP (2008), available at http://www.nceo.org/library/eo_stat.html.
5 Id.
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employees who own stock in their employer hold their shares through an
ESOP. 6
The majority of ESOPs are sponsored by companies that are taxed under
subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). These entities, which are
commonly called C corporations, pay the corporate tax. Keeping with that
terminology, ESOPs sponsored by such corporations are called C ESOPs.
Although ESOPs are more than thirty years old, 7 until 1998, corporations
taxed under subchapter S of the Code could not sponsor ESOPs. 8
S corporations are corporations that do not pay the corporate tax. 9 Instead,
items of income and expense are passed through an S corporation to its
shareholders. 10 S corporations are subject to a wide range of restrictions,
including a limit on the number of shareholders (100), 11 a prohibition on
issuing more than one class of stock, 12 and restrictions on who can be a
shareholder. 13 Until Congress changed the law in the late 1990’s, an ESOP
could not own the stock of an S corporation. 14 In 1996 and 1997, Congress
made several changes in the tax law, which opened the way for
S corporations to sponsor ESOPs. 15

6 Steven F. Freeman, Effects of ESOP Adoption and Employee Ownership: Thirty
Years of Research and Experience 2 (Univ. of Pa. Ctr. for Organizational Dynamics,
Working Paper No. 07-01, 2007), available at http://www.communitywealth.org/_pdfs/articles-publications/esops/paper-freeman.pdf. The next most popular
means for employees to hold employer shares is through a 401(k) plan. Id.
7 For a brief history of the development of ESOPs, see Corey Rosen, How
S Corporation ESOPs Came To Be, in INTRODUCTION TO S CORPORATION ESOPS 1 (Scott
Rodrick ed., 2d ed. 2005).
8 Id. at 5.
9 The exemption of S corporations from the corporate income tax is by virtue of
I.R.C. § 1363(a) (2009).
10 I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A) (2007).
11 Id.
12 I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D).
13 I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1). Only individuals, estates, certain trusts, and exemption
organizations can hold the shares of an S corporation. Id.
14 Until 1998, an ESOP was not a permissible shareholder of an S corporation. Prior
to 1998, if an ESOP held shares in an S corporation the corporation would not be eligible
to be taxed as an S corporation and so it would be taxed as a C corporation. Robert W.
Smiley, Jr., & Gregory K. Brown, Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), in THE
HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS: DESIGN FUNDING AND ADMINISTRATION 733, 796
(Jerry S. Rosenbloom ed., 6th ed. 2005); I.R.C. § 409(h)(B) (2000) (effective date after
December 31, 1997).
15 Among the most important of these acts was the Small Business Job Protection
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, which added I.R.C. § 1361(c)(6), effective for tax
years beginning after December 31, 1997. This section allows ESOPs to own shares of
S corporations without disqualifying the corporation’s election to be taxed as an
S corporation (that section further provides that an ESOP counts as a single shareholder)
and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, which repealed the application
of the unrelated business income tax to an employee benefit trust if it held shares in an
S corporation.
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Over the last ten years, S ESOPs have flourished. 16 According to some
estimates, S ESOPs account for as much as 40 percent of all ESOPs. 17 And
according to some experts, over the last few years, C ESOP adoptions have
dwindled, with most recent ESOP adoptions being S ESOPs (especially 100percent owned S ESOPs). 18
In spite of their economic impact, S ESOPs were, until recently, largely
hidden from public view. That changed in April 2007, when Samuel Zell, the
Chicago financier and real estate investor, announced that he had reached a
deal to acquire the Tribune for $8.2 billion in a transaction using an
S ESOP. 19
The Tribune is a media giant. When the deal was announced, the Tribune
owned twenty-three television stations, including stations in New York, Los
Angeles, and Chicago; fifteen newspapers, including the Chicago Tribune
and the Los Angeles Times; and had 23,000 employees. 20 In addition, the
Tribune owned the Chicago Cubs baseball team and Wrigley Field. 21
Because of the size of the Tribune deal and the Tribune’s ownership of
several American icons, Zell’s Tribune transaction brought S ESOPs into
public view. 22
Press reports contain numerous suggestions that the tax benefits from
Zell’s innovative transaction allowed Zell to increase his bid for the Tribune
over those of his rivals. 23 Several prominent financial commentators
predicted that many acquirers would employ the same structure when
16 See Corey Rosen, ESOPs in S corporations, in COREY ROSEN & SCOTT RODRICK,
UNDERSTANDING ESOPS 39 (2008). S ESOPs also have their own trade association:
Employee-Owned S corporations of America (ESCA).
17 Proposed Synthetic Equity Tax Threatens Future S-Corp ESOPs, OWNERS AT
WORK (Ohio Employee Ownership Center, Kent State University), Winter 2007/2008, at
3.
18 That view was expressed by several experts in attendance at the ESOP
Roundtable sponsored by the Center for Organizational Dynamics at the University of
Pennsylvania on May 3, 2008.
19 Although press reports regularly describe the acquisition price for the Tribune as
$8.2 billion, the Tribune has $13 billion in outstanding debt, the difference being prior
debt that was not retired as part of the Zell deal. See Fran Spielman & David Roeder, Zell
No to State Bid for Wrigley; Trib Chief Not Sold on Maverick Financing Deal, CHI. SUN
TIMES, May 13, 2008, at 3.
20 McIntyre, supra note 1.
21 Ameet Sachdev & Michael Oneal, Meet the Cubs’ $900 Million Man, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 23, 2009, at C1.
22 See, e.g., Theo Francis, ESOP Fables: Employee Control Has Downsides, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 3, 2007, at B9; Theo Francis, Tribune Highlights Perils of Employee
Ownership, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 2, 2007, at B4; Tami Luhby, ESOP is Key to Making
Tribune Deal Work, NEWSDAY, Apr. 3, 2007, at A44; Michael Oneal, Tribune Offers Big
Payday or Mayday, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 27, 2007, at C1; Allan Sloan, Tribune Deal Makes
Zell Ace of Tax Dodgers, WASH. POST, May 1, 2007, at D2; Louis Uchitelle, Employee
Owners Don’t Necessarily Have a Say in Management, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, at C1.
23 Chandler et al., supra note 3; Theo Francis, Tribune Highlights Perils of
Employee Ownership, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 2, 2007, at B4; Michael Oneal & Phil
Rosenthal, Tribune Bidders Ask For New Data; Burkle, Broad Seek Zell Offer’s Details,
May Try to Top It, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 26, 2007, at C1; Katharine Q. Seelye & Richard
Siklos, Chicagoan Puts Up $315 Million to Win $8.2 Billion Tribune Co., N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 3, 2007, at A1.
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acquisition activity next heated up. 24 The Tribune transaction also caught the
eye of legislators. As part of a proposed comprehensive reform of the
corporate tax system, Congressman Charles Rangel (D-NY), chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee, has offered a provision to increase taxes
on interests held indirectly through an S ESOP (synthetic equity), such as the
interest held by Zell. 25
Yet, in spite of the attention now being given to S ESOPs, there has been
little in-depth analysis of the tax treatment of S ESOPs. Accordingly, the
purpose of this Article is to analyze the tax consequences of using an
S ESOP. Specifically, I evaluate whether the use of an S ESOP provides tax
advantages (and disadvantages) that are not generally available with other
transactional structures. I also quantify those advantages (and disadvantages)
when they arise. Finally, I apply those insights to the Zell Tribune transaction
and estimate the likely tax savings and the increase in bid price that can be
attributed to tax savings from the structure.
II. WHAT IS AN ESOP?
Broadly speaking, an ESOP is a type of defined contribution employee
benefit plan. As with other defined contribution plans—such as 401(k),
403(a), and 403(b) plans—the employer makes contributions on behalf of its
employees. 26 Employees sometimes also contribute. In contrast with defined
benefit plans, employees with a defined contribution plan are not provided
with a guaranteed benefit, such as a pension for the rest of their lives. 27
Instead, they are entitled to receive either the actual securities they have in
their accounts or the market value of those securities. 28
With an ESOP, the sponsoring company sets up a trust for the principal
purpose of acquiring and holding the sponsor’s securities for the benefit of its
employees. The ESOP thus provides participants with an ownership interest
in their employer. Proponents of employee ownership emphasize the
incentive and team-building advantages of paying employees in part with
employer stock. 29 Critics argue that concentrating employees’ financial
resources in their employer’s securities increases their exposure to their
employer’s fortunes. 30 That debate, between the advantages of more closely
aligned incentives and the disadvantages of increased concentration of

24 McIntyre, supra note 1, at 8; Nat’l. Ctr. For Employee Ownership, Coming
Things That Never Came, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP REP, July–Aug. 2008, at 15. Some
commentators argued that Zell’s control rights are weaker than in a typical buyout and so
other acquires might not follow. McIntyre, supra note 1, at 8. Other commentators
disputed the claim that Zell lacks sufficient control. Id.
25 Tax Reduction Reform Act, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. § 3701 (2007).
26 BNA TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIOS, No. 814 § I(A)(2)(b)(5) (2008).
27 BNA TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIOS, No. 814 § I(A)(2) (2008).
28 Corey Rosen, How ESOPs Work, in S CORPORATION ESOPS 7–8 (Scott Rodrick
ed., 2d ed. 2005).
29 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 6, at 7.
30 Id. at 9.
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investments, 31 has been the central issue in the debate over ESOPs in
particular, and employee ownership in general, for many years. 32
ESOPs can be used to achieve a range of purposes. The most common
use of an ESOP is to purchase the shares of a closely held company from a
departing owner. 33 In such circumstances, an ESOP is a way for the
departing owner to cash out, maintain control of the company for a period of
time, and arrange for succession. 34 ESOPs can also be used to provide
employees with stock-based compensation so as to better align their interests
with those of the stockholders. Other uses include divesting or acquiring
subsidiaries, buying back publicly held shares (especially as a takeover
defense), and restructuring benefit plans. 35
ESOPs are authorized and regulated by the Employee Retirement Income
and Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Among the requirements that an ESOP
must satisfy are the following: 36
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

the ESOP must be designed to invest primarily in securities
of the employer; 37
contributions cannot exceed statutory maximums; 38
individual beneficiaries must be able to vote the shares that
have been allocated to their individual accounts; 39 shares
not yet allocated can be voted by the ESOP trustee; 40

31 In the language of finance, increased concentration raises the level of unique (or

nonsystematic) risk. Unique risk is risk that can be eliminated through diversification. In
contrast, systematic risk is that risk that cannot be eliminated by diversification, but can
only be shifted among owners. Systematic risk is compensated for in the market (through
a higher return); unique risk is not compensated. See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL.,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 162 (8th ed. 2006). It is because the market provides
no compensation for bearing unique risk that some commentators argue employee stock
ownership is a bad idea. Freeman, supra note 6, at 9.
32 For a comprehensive and recent survey of the literature on the costs and benefits
of ESOPs, see Freeman, supra note 6.
33 Rosen, supra note 28, at 9.
34 Jeffrey Tomich, ESOPs Have One-for-All Appeal, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct.
30, 2005, at E1.
35 For discussions of the various reasons why companies establish ESOPs, see Corey
Rosen, Things To Do With An ESOP Besides Buying Out the Owner, in THE ESOP
READER (Scott Rodrick & Corey Rosen eds., 4th ed. 2005); Jared Kaplan et al., ESOPs,
in BNA TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIOS, No. 354 § I(B) (2008).
36 For a comprehensive discussion of the various provisions that regulate ESOPs,
see Kaplan et al., supra note 35.
37 I.R.C. § 409(l) (2006).
38 The limit on tax-deductible contributions to defined benefit plans is 25% of
covered compensation. I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A) (Supp. 2008).
39 I.R.C. § 409(e) (2006). If directions are not timely received, then the trustee can
vote these shares. See Rev. Rul. 95-57, 1995-2 C.B. 62. The employees’ right to vote
their shares applies only to certain key issues. See Rosen, How ESOPs Work, supra note
28, at 16.
40 See Kaplan et al, supra note 35, at § II(B)(2).
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(iv)

ESOP participants have the right to diversify their accounts
once they reach certain age and service benchmarks; 41
(v)
the ESOP must meet certain distribution and vesting
requirements; 42
(vi) the trustee is subject to the general fiduciary duties of
ERISA; 43
(vii) if the ESOP borrows money, it is subject to a series of
additional restrictions; 44
(viii) the employee has the right to put the employer’s securities
back to the employer at its fair market price if there is not a
liquid market for the securities; 45 and
(ix) participation in the ESOP cannot occur on a discriminatory
basis. 46

If the ESOP meets all of the above requirements, then the parties’
transactions with the ESOP are taxed according to a specific set of rules that
apply to ESOPs. 47 Those rules are widely considered to be very attractive
because they confer various tax benefits on the sponsoring employer and the
participants that are not otherwise available. However, before discussing the
tax treatment of ESOP transactions, the next Part gives a simple example of a
leveraged ESOP.
III. HOW ESOPS WORK
The typical ESOP is leveraged. That is to say, it uses borrowed money to
finance the purchase of the employer’s stock. In a leveraged ESOP, the
company establishes a trust and the trust borrows money to fund the purchase
of employer stock. 48 Over time, the employer makes contributions to the
plan and the plan uses that money to repay the principal and interest on the

41 When employees reach age fifty and have ten years of service, the company must
give them the option of diversifying twenty-five percent of their account balances or
withdrawing that amount. I.R.C. § 401(a)(28)(B) (2006). At age sixty, employees can
have half of their account balances diversified or distributed to them. Id.
42 For discussions of these provisions, see, for example, Kaplan et al., supra note 35,
at § II(C), and Scott Rodrick, ESOP Distribution and Diversification Rules, in THE ESOP
READER 108, 109–11 (Scott Rodrick & Corey Rosen eds., 3d ed. 2003).
43 Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2006).
44 For a discussion of these provisions, see Kaplan et al., supra note 35, at § II(C).
45 I.R.C. § 409(h) (2006).
46 For a brief summary of the participation rules, see Corey Rosen, Questions and
Answers on Operating an ESOP, in THE ESOP READER 120, 120–21 (Scott Rodrick &
Corey Rosen eds., 3d ed. 2003).
47 These rules are set forth in I.R.C. § 409 and the accompanying regulations. See 26
C.F.R. §§ 1.409(p)-1, 1.409-1T (2006).
48 Typically, the company borrows the money from a lender and relends the money
to the ESOP. The proceeds of the loan are used to acquire the employer’s stock either
from the company or from other shareholders. If the stock is acquired from the company,
the company can use the proceeds in its business for any legitimate purpose. If the stock
is acquired from investors, they can use the money as they like. The ESOP Association,
What is a Leveraged ESOP?, http://www.esopassociation.org/about/about_leveraged.asp
(last visited April 22, 2009).

2009]

ZELL, TRIBUNE AND S ESOP

525

ESOP loan. 49 Shares in a leveraged ESOP are initially held in a “suspense
account.” 50 As the loan is repaid, shares are released into the individual
accounts of plan participants. 51
Consider the following simple example of a leveraged ESOP. E Corp.
establishes an ESOP and agrees to sell that ESOP 100 shares of E Corp. at a
price of $10 per share. The ESOP funds the purchase by borrowing $1000 at
an interest rate of 10 percent, compounded annually. Upon transfer, the 100
shares are held in a suspense account for the benefit of E Corp.’s covered
employees. The terms of the loan call for the loan to be repaid in ten equal
annual installments of $162.75. At the end of the first year, E Corp.
contributes $162.75 to the ESOP. The ESOP, in turn, pays that same amount
to the lender. Of that $162.75, $100 is payment of accrued interest and
$62.75 is repayment of principal. The principal payment of $62.75 reduces
the outstanding balance of the ESOP loan by 6.27 percent. Accordingly, 6.27
shares 52 will be released from the suspense account into the accounts of
individual ESOP participants. 53 The contribution from the company to the
ESOP, the ESOP’s payment of interest and principal, and the number of
shares released from the suspense account each year are given in Table 1.
Table 1: A Simple Example of a Leveraged ESOP
Year

Contribution

Interest

Principal

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Total

$162.75
162.75
162.75
162.75
162.75
162.75
162.75
162.75
162.75
162.75
$1627.45

$100
93.73
86.82
79.23
70.88
61.69
51.59
40.47
28.25
14.80
$627.45

$62.75
69.02
75.92
83.51
91.87
101.05
111.16
122.27
134.50
147.95
$1000.00

Shares
Released
6.27
6.90
7.59
8.35
9.19
10.11
11.12
12.23
13.45
14.80
100

At the end of year 10, the ESOP loan has been repaid and 100 shares of
E Corp. stock are in the ESOP accounts of the individual employees. If E
Corp. has not paid any dividends over the prior ten years, then the shares will
be the only assets in the ESOP. 54 Obviously, the total value of the ESOP
accounts will depend upon how much each share of E Corp. is worth. If that
stock has appreciated, the accounts, in aggregate, will be worth more than
$1000; if it has declined, they will be worth less.
49 BNA TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIOS, No. 814 § I(A)(2)(b)(5) (2008).
50 Id.
51 The release generally must follow one of two formulae. See Rosen, supra note 46,

at 122. In either case, because of stock price volatility, the market value of the shares
released each year will rarely equal the principal repayment on the loan that year.
52 That is 6.27 percent of the 100 shares in the ESOP’s suspense account.
53 The example assumes immediate vesting.
54 The example assumes no diversification of the individual ESOP accounts.
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IV. A CLOSE LOOK AT THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF USING AN S ESOP
The ESOP literature frequently extols tax benefits as one of the principal
advantages of and therefore motivations for using an ESOP. 55 In order for
that claim to have merit, the tax benefits of ESOPs on net—after taking out
any disadvantages—must be substantially greater than the tax benefits on net
that can be achieved through feasible alternative transactions. The tax
consequences of C ESOPs were examined by Myron Scholes and Mark
Wolfson in 1990, 56 several years before Congress authorized S ESOPs. 57 In
this Article, I examine the tax consequences of S ESOPs. 58 Accordingly, in
this Part, I take a close look at the tax advantages and disadvantages of
S ESOPs relative to other structures. 59
55 The interested reader should see, e.g., the website of the National Center for

Employee Ownership, http://www.nceo.org.
56 Myron S. Scholes & Mark A. Wolfson, Employee Stock Ownership Plans and
Corporate Restructuring: Myths and Realities, FIN. MGMT., Spring 1990, at 12.
57 Congress authorized S ESOPs in 1996, and the provisions became effective on
January 1, 1998. Rosen, supra note 7, at 5.
58 The method I use to analyze the tax consequences of the S ESOP structure
endeavors to make an “apples-to-apples” comparison across all parties. The tax
consequences of a transaction cannot be understood by just looking at how one party to a
transaction is taxed. In order to evaluate the tax consequences of a transaction, it is
important to employ an all-parties perspective. If a tax benefit to one party is offset by a
tax detriment to another party, then there is no net benefit to the structure. In such cases,
no party will likely be helped or hurt by the tax treatment. Instead, the parties are likely to
undo the effect of the tax consequences through the terms of the transaction. It is also
important to separate the tax and non-tax consequences of a transaction by holding the
non-tax consequences equal across transactions so as to avoid confounding tax and nontax consequences. The method for making accurate tax comparisons was developed by
Merton H. Miller & Myron S. Scholes, Executive Compensation, Taxes and Incentives, in
FINANCIAL ECONOMICS ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PAUL COOTNER 179, 190–201 (1982). That
method was introduced to the legal literature by Michael S. Knoll, The Tax Efficiency of
Stock-Based Compensation, 103 TAX NOTES 203 (2004), and David I. Walker, Is Equity
Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 695, 699 (2004). That method has been
picked up by various legal scholars and is now part of the regular discourse. See Eric D.
Chason, Deferred Compensation Reform: Taxing the Fruit of the Tree in its Proper
Season, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 348 (2006); Chris William Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage
to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers with Profit Shares: What Is It? Why Is It Bad?,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071, 1077 (2008); Ethan Yale, Investment Risk and the Tax Benefit of
Deferred Compensation, 62 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1279455.
59 Some proponents of ESOPs argue that the tax benefits to S ESOPs are less
generous than those granted to C ESOPs because the seller of shares to an S ESOP cannot
take advantage of I.R.C. § 1042. See, e.g., Corey Rosen, ESOPs in S corporations, in THE
ESOP READER 38, 40–41 (Scott Rodrick & Corey Rosen eds., 3d ed. 2003). Section 1042
allows the seller of shares to an ESOP to defer paying tax on the gain from those shares if
all of the following conditions are met: (i) the company is a closely held C corporation;
(ii) the seller held her shares for three years or longer; (iii) after the sale, the ESOP holds
30 percent or more of the employer’s stock; and (iv) the seller’s reinvest the funds in
qualified replacement securities, essentially stocks and bonds of domestic corporations
without too much passive income. I.R.C. § 1042(a)–(c) (2006). If the seller satisfies all of
those conditions, then the seller can defer her capital gain tax until she sells the
replacement securities. By its own terms, Section 1042 does not apply to sales to S
ESOPs. See I.R.C. § 1042(c)(1)(A) (limiting scope of exclusion to employer securities
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A. Tax Advantages: Claims and Responses
Commentators and ESOP promoters regularly claim that there are
substantial tax benefits from using an S ESOP. 60 They generally make two
claims. First, they claim that the ESOP structure allows the employer to
deduct repayment of principal on loans incurred by the ESOP. 61 Because
contributions to an ESOP are deductible, an employer that establishes a
leveraged ESOP—an ESOP that borrows funds to purchase employer
securities—can deduct repayment of principal. 62 In contrast, in other
situations—including leveraged buyouts—repayment of loan principal is not
deductible. 63 Second, ESOP proponents regularly claim that the use of an
S ESOP allows participants to defer tax on their income received through the
ESOP. 64 Both claims are usually made in a manner that suggests that such
benefits are, if not unique to the ESOP structure, sufficiently rare to warrant
attention. 65
1. Deduction of Principal
Subject to limitations on amount, payments made by an employer to an
S ESOP are deductible by the employer. 66 Because those contributions
usually go to pay interest and principal on the ESOP loan, the employer can,

“issued by a domestic C corporation”). The claim that C ESOP tax benefits are more
generous than S ESOP benefits has some merit. The ability to defer tax on the sale if the
proceeds are invested in qualified securities is valuable. In the extreme, if the qualified
securities are held until death, the seller of shares to the ESOP can permanently avoid the
entire tax on the gain from those shares. Moreover, although there are some techniques
that have traditionally been used to transfer the economic interest from owning an asset
without triggering immediate taxation, and so would enable sellers to obtain in essence
the tax benefit afforded by Section 1042 without using that provision, such
“monetization” techniques have been sharply curtailed by the law. I.R.C. § 1259
(constructing sale rules). Thus, the tax benefit afforded sellers to a C ESOP cannot
readily be replicated by sellers who do not meet the requirement of that provision.
60 Rosen, supra note 46, at 134.
61 Id.
62 Rosen, supra note 28, at 7–8; David Ackerman, Legal Considerations for
S corporation ESOPs, in S CORPORATION ESOPS 27, 33–35 (Scott Rodrick ed., 2d ed.
2005); Chandler et al., supra note 3; Ashley M. Heher, Tribune Accepts Buyout Offer
From Zell, Plans to Sell Cubs, BUFF. NEWS, Apr. 3, 2007, at B7; Mary Lynn F. Jones,
Employee Ownership Plans Offer Risks, Rewards, PRESSTIME, May 2007, at 20; Tami
Luhby, ESOP Is Key to Making Tribune Deal Work, NEWSDAY, Apr. 3, 2007, at A44;
Thomas S. Mulligan, How Zell’s Offer for Tribune Might Work, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29,
2007, at C1.
63 A related claim that is sometimes made with respect to S ESOPs is that when the
ESOP owns 100 percent of the company’s stock that no portion of the company’s income
is taxable. See, e.g., Editorial, ESOP Expectation and Reality, CRAIN’S, Apr. 16, 2007, at
10.
64 Karen D. Ng, ESOP—The Misunderstood Plan, 26 S.F. ATT’Y 17, Oct.–Nov.
2000.
65 See Rosen, supra note 16 (describing unique tax advantages of S ESOP structure).
66 The maximum amount that employers can generally deduct for contributions to an
ESOP is 25 percent of total employee compensation. I.R.C. § 404(a)(3) (Supp. 2008).
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in effect, deduct both interest and principal on itS ESOP loans. 67 The ability
to deduct principal is often described as a major tax benefit available only to
employers who adopt an ESOP. 68
Start with the employer. Returning to the example, the employer deducts
the payment it makes each year to the S ESOP on behalf of its participants.
Thus, the employer would deduct the amount contained in the column
labeled “contribution” each year. That is to say, the employer would deduct
$162.75 each year for 10 years. For shareholders in the 35 percent tax
bracket, the deduction reduces taxes by $56.96 each year. Thus, over ten
years, the deductions reduce the shareholders’ taxes by $569.61.
Although interest payments in commercial settings are usually
deductible, principal payments are almost never deductible. Specifically, the
repayment of principal on a loan incurred in a leveraged buyout is not
deductible. Thus, if the employer borrowed the funds itself, then only the
interest payments would be deductible. In terms of the example, the
employer deducts $100 in year 1 and $627.45 over ten years. At a tax rate of
35 percent, the interest deductions reduce the borrower’s taxes by $219.61
over ten years. Thus, over the ten-year loan term, the ESOP loan generates
tax savings of $569.61, whereas the corporate loan reduces taxes by only
$219.61. The difference—$350—is one advantage of using an S ESOP.
Thus, it is often claimed that a major advantage of using an ESOP is that the
principal payments on the ESOP loan are, in effect, deductible. 69
That argument, however, is wrong. The flaw in that argument was first
described by Scholes and Wolfson in 1990 in the context of C ESOPs. 70
Contributions to C ESOPs, they pointed out, are not unusual in being
deductible. 71 Contributions to other pension plans are also deductible, as are
other compensation payments, including straight salary. 72 With only minor
exceptions, none of which is relevant here, 73 all compensation paid to
employees is deductible by the employer. 74 Moreover, payments made by a
corporation to an ESOP—whether a C ESOP or an S ESOP—benefit only
the ESOP’s participants, and not other equity holders. Thus, contributions
that are used to repay principal on an ESOP loan are, in effect, compensation

67 With a C ESOP, contributions that go to pay principal on an ESOP loan do not

count against the 25 percent limit. I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A) (Supp. 2008). Instead, for such
contributions, there is an additional 25 percent limit for contributions that go to pay
principal. I.R.C. § 404(a)(9)(A) (Supp. 2008). Contributions that go to pay interest on the
C corporation’s ESOP loan are not limited. I.R.C. § 404(a)(9)(B). For S ESOPs, there are
no increased limits. I.R.C. § 404(a)(9)(C). Instead, for S ESOPs, contributions that go to
pay for principal and/or interest on the ESOP loan count against the general 25 percent
limit. I.R.C. § 404(a)(9)(C) (2000).
68 See Corey Rosen, An Overview of ESOPs, in THE ESOP READER 1, 3 (Scott
Rodrick & Corey Rosen eds., 3d ed. 2003).
69 Scholes & Wolfson, supra note 56, at 22.
70 Id. at 16.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 For example, the $1 million limit on executive compensation under I.R.C.
§ 162(m) (2006).
74 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2000).
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paid to those participants and so are properly deducted by the employer who
makes them. 75
The above argument applies with equal force whether an ESOP is owned
by a C corporation or an S corporation. Of course, an S ESOP might own 100
percent of a company, in which case no one gets the deduction. 76 More
generally, if an S ESOP owns a fraction of the company, say 30 percent, then
the holders of the rest of the stock (70 percent of shares held outside of the
ESOP) will have passed through to them 70 percent of the corporation’s net
income after payment of all expenses, including compensation. Treating cash
payments made to an S ESOP as expenses—whether used to repay principal
on a loan or otherwise—ensures that the remaining shareholders have
apportioned to them their share of the corporation’s income, and neither
more nor less than that amount. There is nothing special or unusual about the
deduction. Indeed, what would be extraordinary would be to deny that
deduction.
In effect, the deduction for ESOP contributions ensures that there is only
one level of tax with an S ESOP. Although one level of tax is generally better
than two, one level of tax is not unique to businesses that use an S ESOP.
There are numerous ways to achieve one level of tax. First, one can use a
pass-through entity. For example, by organizing a business as a sole
proprietorship or by using an S corporation, a partnership, or a limited
liability company (LLC), the owners of the business can avoid the corporate
tax and subject themselves to only one level of taxation. 77 In other words, an
S corporation without an S ESOP will also avoid a second level of tax.
Second, leverage can be used to achieve a single level of taxation when the
business is held through a C corporation. 78 Because interest is deductible
from the income of the corporate payor, whereas dividends and redemptions
are not, leverage reduces exposure to the corporate tax. 79 Many companies
have a high debt-to-equity ratio as a means to reduce corporate tax by
stripping interest income out from a corporation through interest payments. 80
It therefore follows that the claim that the ability to deduct principal
payments on the ESOP loan is a substantial advantage of establishing an
S ESOP is without merit. A company with an S ESOP is subject to one level

75 Scholes & Wolfson, supra note 56, at 16.
76 The majority of S ESOPs own 100 percent of their sponsoring company. COREY

ROSEN, NATL. CTR. FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, RETIREMENT SECURITY AND WEALTH
ACCUMULATION
IN
S
ESOP
COMPANIES
14
(2005),
available
at
http://esca.us/documents/NCEO_STUDY.pdf.
77 I.R.C. § 11 (2006) (imposing a tax on corporations).
78 See I.R.C. § 163(a) (making interest deductible).
79 BREALEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 472–76.
80 One advantage of using a pass-through entity rather than debt to provide a single
level of taxation is that the pass-through entity ensures one level of tax. The business
might not support a capital structure made up almost entirely of debt. There is substantial
finance literature that shows that risky and intangible assets cannot support as much debt
as less risky and tangible assets. See, e.g., RONALD W. MASULIS, THE DEBT/EQUITY
CHOICE 90 (1988), Michael Bradley et al., On the Existence of an Optimal Capital
Structure: Theory and Evidence, 39 J. FIN. 857, 873–74 (1984); Michael S. Knoll, Taxing
Prometheus: How the Corporate Interest Deduction Discourages Innovation and RiskTaking, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1461, 1491–94, 1495 (1993).
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of taxation and there are numerous structures that subject the income
generated by a business to only one level of tax. 81 That brings us to the
second claimed tax benefit from using an S ESOP. 82
2. Deferral of Income
From the perspective of the participants, an S ESOP is an example of a
qualified account. The beneficiary of a qualified account is not taxed on
contributions made to that account; 83 she is also not taxed on the
contribution or investment gains and losses during the life of the account; she
is, however, taxed at ordinary income tax rates on the value of the assets
withdrawn from her account. 84 As a result, because S ESOPs are qualified
accounts, participants can defer tax on their account balances as long as they
continue to hold those assets through the S ESOP. However, when
participants withdraw assets from their S ESOP accounts, they pay taxes at
ordinary income tax rates, not at capital gains rates. The deferrals of tax on
the contribution, appreciation, and dividends are widely acknowledged to be
tax advantages from using an S ESOP. 85
The deferral of tax on income earned through an S ESOP is an attractive
feature of using an S ESOP, but it is not unique to S ESOPs. An ESOP is an
example of a qualified account. Taxpayers with qualified accounts can
deduct their contributions to such accounts; when they make withdrawals
from their accounts they include the amounts withdrawn in income at

81 Some proponents of S ESOPs claim that the tax benefits afforded S ESOPs are

less generous than those afforded C ESOPs because dividends paid to a C ESOP are
deductible by the payor provided that the dividends are either: (1) paid in cash; (2)
reinvested in employer securities; or (3) used to repay an ESOP loan. Rosen, supra note
7, at 3; I.R.C. § 404(k) (2006). Because dividends, including dividends paid to S ESOPs,
are not deductible, the treatment of C ESOPs is said to be more favorable than the
treatment of S ESOPs. Rosen, supra note 7, at 3. That claim is questionable. The reason
why is that the § 404(a)(9) deduction for dividends paid to an ESOP offsets what would
otherwise be corporate level tax on the income that is used to pay the dividend.
Ackerman, supra note 62, at 31. C corporations are subject to two levels of tax and the
effect of the deduction is to reduce the tax on such income to one level of tax that is
collected when the individual withdraws the funds. Id. That is the same treatment as
occurs with an S ESOP without the deduction. If there was a deduction for dividends paid
to an ESOP by an S corporation, then that deduction would offset other income and
provide even better treatment. For example, if the deduction were allocated to the ESOP
participant, then such dividend in effect would forever escape tax. Alternatively, if it
were allocated to other owners, then they would escape tax on part of their income.
82 Moreover, because there are no tax consequences to parties other than the
participants from the decision to use an ESOP—that is true for both S and C ESOPs
(except for the Section 1042 deferral granted to some sellers to C ESOPs)—the tax
consequences of the decision to use an S ESOP can be ascertained by looking solely at
the participants.
83 If the contribution is made by the beneficiary out of assets that either will be taxed
or already have been taxed, such as with cash contributions into an individual retirement
account, then the contribution is deductible. See I.R.C. § 219(a) (granting individual
taxpayers deductions for their qualified retirement contributions).
84 I.R.C. § 402(a) (2006).
85 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 62, at 34.
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ordinary rates. 86 Also, the limits on qualified accounts are for the total
amount contributed to all accounts; the limits are not separate for each type
of account. 87 Moreover, the limit, 25 percent of income, 88 is generally more
than most employees contribute, 89 and so for most employees the limit is not
binding. Thus, for most employers, an ESOP is a substitute for other
qualified accounts.
B. Tax Disadvantages: An Old Claim, a Response, and a New Claim
In this section, I discuss two possible disadvantages from using an
S ESOP. The first—which has been pointed out by others—is questionable;
the second—which to my knowledge has not been recognized previously—
exists and can arise frequently.
1. A Higher Tax Rate on Gains
Commentators sometimes claim that the higher ordinary income tax rate
that applies to withdrawals from an ESOP is a disadvantage of investing
through an ESOP. 90 The argument goes as follows: when holding the stock
directly would produce long-term capital gain, then the higher ordinary
income tax rate paid on that income is a tax disadvantage of using an
ESOP. 91
That simple and intuitive argument, however, is mistaken because it is
incomplete. In order to be taxed at long-term capital gains rates on the
appreciation in the stock, the stock must be held by the employee directly
and not in a qualified account. 92 That, in turn, requires that the employer pay
the employee a salary and the employee purchase the stock. 93 In that case,
the employee will have taxable income when paid. In contrast, with an
ESOP, the employee does not have taxable income when the contributions
are made. 94 Instead, the participant is taxed only when funds are withdrawn
from the account. 95 As is well-known in the tax literature, the effect of
deferring tax on a sum is equivalent to exempting the return on that sum from
86 Rosen, supra note 28, at 20.
87 I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A) (2006).
88 Id.
89 See Freeman, supra note 6, at 6; ROSEN, RETIREMENT SECURITY, supra note 76, at

5 (“Typical U.S. company contribution plans . . . fall in the range of 2% to 3% of eligible
pay.”).
90 See Rosen, supra note 68, at 12.
91 Although I assume throughout this Article in making my calculations that S ESOP
participants would be taxed at 35 percent—the top ordinary rate—many S ESOP
participants are likely taxed at lower rates. See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(14), 409(a)(1), 414(q)
(2006).
92 Withdrawals from qualified accounts, of which ESOPs are a species, are taxed at
ordinary income tax rates. See I.R.C. § 1042.
93 The stock, then, is a capital asset. See I.R.C. § 1221. Its sale thus produces a
capital gain, or loss. I.R.C. § 1222.
94 In both instances, the employer has a deduction when the contribution is made so
there is no employer side difference.
95 Rosen, supra note 68, at 14–15.
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tax until the end of the deferral period. 96 Thus, the effect of investing
through an ESOP—or another qualified account—is to exempt the return on
the assets from taxation for as long as they are in the ESOP. From an
economic standpoint, the return on those assets while held through the ESOP
is not taxed at 35 percent upon withdrawal, but is effectively untaxed.
Exemption is obviously more attractive than being subject to tax (albeit
deferred) at a 15 percent tax rate.
2. Borrowing Without an Interest Deduction
As described above, an ESOP is an attractive saving vehicle because it
defers taxation on the funds held through the ESOP. With an ESOP, taxation
of the beneficiary on both the contribution and the return on that contribution
are deferred until the beneficiary withdraws the funds. The effect of such
deferral is the economic equivalent of taxing beneficiaries on their
employers’ contributions at ordinary income tax rates when earned and
exempting the return on those contributions from tax for as long as those
amounts are held in ESOP accounts. That equivalence also implies that the
borrower, in effect, loses the interest deduction when borrowing through an
ESOP.
Viewing the ESOP loan from the employee’s perspective, the employer
has agreed to make cash contributions to an ESOP for the employee’s
benefit. The employee, rather than waiting to receive the employer’s
contributions before acquiring the employer’s stock, borrows through the
ESOP and purchases the stock right away. The employers’ subsequent
contributions, instead of going to purchase shares of the employers’ stock,
pay principal and interest on the ESOP loan. Because the appreciation on the
balance in an ESOP account is effectively untaxed, that exemption applies to
both the income earned on the ESOP’s assets and the interest paid on the
ESOP loan. 97 In other words, the interest paid by the employee on the ESOP
loan is not deductible. That, in turn, implies that the tax benefit of an ESOP
is that the net return for the duration of the ESOP on the funds contributed to
through the ESOP escapes tax. 98

96 See E. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in

INCOME, EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HASEN 300,
302–14 (1948), reprinted in AM. ECON. ASS’N, READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF
TAXATION 525–37 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959); William O.
Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash-Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1113, 1123–26 (1974). The equivalence result assumes that the tax rate is the same when
the contribution is made and when the account is liquidated.
97 Between contributions, the employee’s account balance is reduced by interest
accruing on the ESOP loan.
98 The interest on the ESOP loan is also not deductible when the loan is viewed from
the employer’s perspective. With an ESOP, the employer deducts its contributions to the
ESOP when they are made. Those payments pay principal and interest. Deferring the
employer’s deduction until payment is equivalent to providing the employer with an
upfront deduction for its contribution (principal) and not allowing a subsequent deduction
for the increased contribution (interest).
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C. A Fairly Simple Example of the Tax Benefits of Using an S ESOP
The tax advantage from using an S ESOP can be illustrated using the
example from Part III. 99 Although E Corp.’S ESOP holds 100 shares, the
interests of the ESOP participants in their employer’s securities is not the
same as if they held 100 shares on personal account. Since the participants
pay tax at ordinary income tax rates on any assets withdrawn from the ESOP,
the government in effect owns 35 percent of the assets in the ESOP. Because
the only assets in the ESOP are 100 shares of the employer’s stock, the
government’s claim is, in effect, a claim to thirty-five shares. Thus, the
S ESOP participants are the economic owners of sixty-five shares of their
employer’s stock. Moreover, the participants are entitled to receive their
sixty-five shares free of taxes and with a basis equal to their fair market value
when they withdraw their shares—or an equivalent amount of cash—from
the ESOP. 100 Thus, any appreciation on those sixty-five shares that occurs
while they are within the ESOP is never taxed.
It follows from above that the tax benefit to the participants from using
an ESOP (rather than holding their shares directly) depends upon how the
participants would be taxed if they held their shares directly. There are two
polar cases to consider. The tax burden on direct ownership of the
S corporation is generally at its lowest when the income is deferred and taxed
as capital gain upon sale (case 1). The tax burden on direct ownership is
generally at its highest when the income is taxed currently as ordinary
income (case 2). 101
1. Income from Direct Ownership is Deferred Capital Gain (Case 1)
Assume that all of the income from direct ownership would be deferred
and taxed at 15 percent as long-term capital gain upon sale. 102 In order to
evaluate the tax consequences of the S ESOP structure, consider an otherwise
similar group of employees who do not participate in the ESOP, but instead
acquire an economically equivalent interest directly. 103 Accordingly, in order
to have the same exposure to their employer’s stock as do the ESOP
participants, the nonparticipants would have to purchase 76.47 shares at a

99 This simple example does not take into account the disadvantage from borrowing
through an ESOP. That disadvantage is introduced later in Part IV.B, infra.
100 An S ESOP will usually distribute cash, not employer securities, because the sale
of any stock of an S corporation to a disqualified person will disqualify the corporation’s
S election and subject the corporation to corporate tax. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1) (setting
forth requirements to be an S corporation).
101 It is possible for a corporation to generate large amounts of income for several
years followed by a large capital loss. In such circumstances, the tax burden on direct
ownership exceeds the statutory tax rate. I ignore such possibilities below.
102 I.R.C. § 1222 (2006).
103 In order to qualify as an ESOP, the trust must cover most employees. See I.R.C.
§§ 401(a)(3), 410 (2006). I use the possibility of nonparticipants synthesizing an interest
in the ESOP as a heuristic device in order to describe the tax impact of using an S ESOP.
In such a comparison, I ignore any difference in the vesting of shares over time.
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cost of $764.71. 104 The nonparticipants do not have to purchase as many
shares as are in the ESOP—100 shares—because they will receive 85
percent, instead of only 65 percent, on any subsequent appreciation or
depreciation. 105 In order to pay for their shares, assume that the
nonparticipants borrow $764.71.
Because the nonparticipating employees do not benefit from
contributions to the ESOP, they will receive additional salary of $162.75 a
year for ten years. The present value of that salary (discounted at 10 percent)
is $1000. Because the salary is taxable at 35 percent, the nonparticipants will
pay $350 in taxes, leaving them with $650. In other words, the additional
salary payments to the nonparticipants are sufficient after tax to pay the
principal and interest on a $650 loan. 106 I call that $650 loan the “base loan.”
The base loan covers the cost of acquiring the after-tax shares held by the
participating employees. Thus, the nonparticipants’ total loan exceeds the
base loan by $114.71. I call that difference the “incremental loan.” Thus, the
nonparticipating employees will have to pay $114.71 plus accrued interest
when they sell their shares (which is assumed to occur on the same date as
the participating employees withdraw and sell their shares). 107 In terms of
the example, the ESOP loan is $1000, the nonparticipant’s base loan is $650,
their incremental loan is $114.71, and so the nonparticipants’ total loan is
$764.71
Unlike the participating employees, the nonparticipating employees have
basis in their shares. Their aggregate basis is $764.71. Because that basis
offsets capital gain, which is otherwise taxable at 15 percent, that basis
provides a tax savings of exactly $114.71. 108 Thus, the nonparticipating
employees’ tax savings from their basis in their shares will exactly pay off
the principal on the incremental loan. However, the nonparticipating
employees also have to pay interest on that loan. In the example, interest
accrues at 10 percent from the date the ESOP is established until the shares
are withdrawn and sold. The interest on the incremental loan totals $11.47 in
the first year 109 and increases by 10 percent each year. 110
104 Thus, in order to have the same exposure as holding sixty-five shares that are
untaxed, an investor who will be taxed at the 15 percent capital gains rate must purchase
76.47 (65 / (1 - .15)) shares. At a price of $10 a share, the total cost of such a purchase is
$764.71.
105 See I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1222.
106 The calculations in the text assume that the interest on the loan to the
nonparticipating employee is not tax deductible. That assumption takes out the possibility
of tax arbitrage by borrowing and investing in a tax-advantaged investment. If allowance
were made for such a possibility, then the tax advantage from using an S ESOP would be
smaller (and possibly a disadvantage). See discussion infra note 122 and accompanying
text.
107 The nonparticipating employees will sell 76.47 shares. Thus, every dollar
increase in the stock price will generate an additional $76.47. Because that gain is taxed
as long-term capital gain at the 15 percent tax rate, the employees will pay $11.47 in tax
for each dollar increase. Thus, the nonparticipating employees will receive $65 for every
dollar increase in stock price, as do the participating employees.
108 That is to say, 15 percent of $764.71 is $114.71.
109 If the interest is tax deductible, then the after-tax cost is 6.5 percent a year; if not,
that cost is 10 percent a year. The possibility of deducting interest on the loan outside of
the ESOP is discussed below. See infra Part IV.D.3.
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2. Income from Ownership is Taxed Currently as Ordinary Income (Case 2)
The second polar case assumes that direct ownership would generate
only current ordinary income. In that case, the nonparticipating employees
would have to acquire 100 shares in order to have the same exposure as
participating employees with 100 shares in the S ESOP. The nonparticipants
need to purchase 100 shares because all of their income is ordinary—taxed at
35 percent—and so holding 100 shares leaves the nonparticipants with an
after-tax return equal to the before-tax return on 100 shares held through an
ESOP. The cost of such shares is $1000. 111 As above, the salary will cover
principal and interest on the base loan, which covers the cost of purchasing
65 shares. 112 Thus, to match the participants’ exposure, the nonparticipants
must purchase an additional 35 shares for $350. When the nonparticipants
sell their stock and repay the incremental loan, they will pay $350 principal
on that loan. The nonparticipating employees also have $1000 basis, which
translates into a tax savings of $350. That tax savings pays off the principal
on the incremental loan. Thus, one cost of direct ownership in an
S corporation, rather than ownership through that corporation’S ESOP, is the
after-tax interest paid by the nonparticipant on the incremental loan—$350 in
the example.
When the S corporation produces current ordinary income, direct
ownership has a second tax cost. Because the S corporation produces current
income—as opposed to deferred income—the holder of a direct interest has
to pay taxes as the S corporation earns income. In contrast, the holder of an
interest through an ESOP can defer tax on that income generated by an
S corporation. The advantage of such deferral is that the interest on the
income generated by the S corporation can be reinvested and allowed to
compound before paying the tax on that income. Thus, the funds that a direct
owner would otherwise use to pay tax can be reinvested to generate income,
some portion of which the taxpayer will keep. It is the interest that the ESOP
participant earns and keeps on the funds that the nonparticipant would
otherwise use to pay taxes that is the second cost of direct ownership.
D. Estimating the Tax Benefits of Using S ESOPs
In this section, I generalize the above results. This exercise will allow the
reader to estimate the tax benefits to the participants from using an S ESOP
instead of making a direct investment in an S corporation. Denote the
personal tax rate by tp, the capital gains tax rate by tcg, the annual risk-free
interest rate by r, and the time from establishment and funding of the ESOP

110 The situation here is analogous to the decision whether to make the I.R.C.
§ 83(b) election for restricted stock. The ESOP is equivalent to the treatment of restricted
stock under I.R.C. § 83(a). The alternative structure is equivalent to the treatment after
making the I.R.C. § 83(b) election.
111 Thus, to get the same exposure as holding 100 shares that are untaxed, an
investor who will be taxed at the 35 percent ordinary income tax rate purchases 100 (65 /
(1 - .35)) shares. At a price of $10 a share, the total cost is $1000.
112 Once again, that calculation assumes that the interest on the loan to the
nonparticipating employee is not deductible.
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until the assets are withdrawn and taxed by n. Also, denote the purchase price
of the employer’s stock at the date the ESOP is established by P0.
1. Income from Direct Ownership is Deferred Capital Gain (Case 1)
In this section, I derive a formula for the cost to an employee of
holding one share of the employer’s stock directly, rather than holding an
equivalent economic interest through an S ESOP. I show that the effect of
holding one share of the S corporation directly rather than indirectly through
an S ESOP is that the direct investor is, in effect, tying up [(1- tp) tcg / (1- tcg
)]P0 dollars for each share held in the S ESOP.
The derivation starts with the observation that an employee who holds
one share of her employer’s stock directly does not have the same exposure
to her employer’s stock as an employee who holds one share through an
S ESOP. The former gains $ (1– tcg) for every dollar increase in price,
whereas the latter gains $(1– tp). Thus, holding one share directly rather than
through an S ESOP increases the holder’s economic exposure to her
employer’s stock by (tp– tcg) shares from (1– tp) shares to (1 – tcg) shares.
Accordingly, in order for a direct holder to have the same exposure as a
holder of one share through an S ESOP, the direct holder must hold (1– tp) /
(1– tcg) shares.
The holder of shares through an S ESOP is assumed to finance her
purchase using an ESOP loan. The loan, in turn, is paid off through
contributions by the employer. Assume that the nonparticipating employee
borrows on personal account to acquire her shares. Of course, if the
employee does not participate in the ESOP, there is no reason for the
employer to make contributions to the ESOP on her behalf. Instead, assume
the equivalent amount is paid directly to the employee as salary. After paying
taxes, the additional salary can carry and repay the base loan—the cost of
purchasing (1– tp) shares. 113 It, therefore, follows that the incremental loan
covers the cost of acquiring (1– tp) tcg / (1– tcg) shares. That additional loan
puts the direct investor and the ESOP participant on the same cash flow
footing at the beginning of the transaction. By comparing the cash flow when
the ESOP participant withdraws and sells stock to the cash flow when the
nonparticipant sells stock, 114 it is possible to compare the two alternatives.
Because the additional basis that the direct holder has from acquiring (1 – tp)
/ (1 – tcg) shares on personal account is worth [(1– tp) tcg / (1– tcg)] P0 when
the shares are sold, that saving will exactly pay off the principal of the direct
stockholder’s incremental loan (the loan to acquire the additional (1– tp) tcg /
(1– tcg) shares not covered by the base loan). Thus, the tax benefit to the
participant from using an S ESOP instead of directly holding shares in the
S corporation is the after-tax interest that the direct holder would pay on the
incremental loan. If we denote the accrued interest on $1 over the ESOP term
by (1+r)n–1, then the tax benefit from using the S ESOP is [(1– tp) tcg / (1–
113 That assumes that interest on the nonparticipating employee’s loan is never
deducted. Alternatively, it assumes that the nonparticipating employee would earn
taxable interest on those funds if she did not use them to buy shares of her employer’s
stock. That is to say, she would otherwise invest those funds through a qualified account.
114 I assume that the nonparticipant sells the stock on the same day that the
participant withdraws cash from the ESOP.
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tcg)] P0 [(1+r)n–1]. Reducing that amount to a present value at the time the
S ESOP is funded 115 implies that the tax benefit to a participant from using
an S ESOP compared with holding shares in the S corporation directly and
being paid additional taxable salary, B, can be written as follows:

⎛ (1 − t p )tcg ⎞ ⎛
⎟ P0 ⎜1 − 1 ⎞⎟
B=⎜
⎜ 1− t
⎟ ⎜⎝ (1 + r ) n ⎟⎠
cg
⎝
⎠

(1)

It follows from equation (1) that the holder is better off with an S ESOP
whenever tax rates are positive and the interest rate is positive. Moreover,
that benefit will increase as the holding period increases. 116
Most of the terms in equation (1) are already known. The personal (tp)
and capital gains (tcg) tax rates are 35 percent and 15 percent, respectively. I
use an annual before-tax interest rate of 3.7 percent for the calculations. 117
Thus, the present values of the tax saving from using an S ESOP, expressed
both in dollars for a $1000 grant and as a percent of the total grant, are given
in Table 2.
Table 2: Tax Benefit of Using an S ESOP Over Direct Ownership (Assumes
Income from Direct Ownership is Deferred Capital Gain) (As a function of time to
withdrawal from the ESOP)
Years
% Grant
Dollars

1
0.41%
$4.09

2
0.80%
$8.04

3
1.18%
$11.85

4
1.55%
$15.52

5
1.91%
$19.05

Years
% Grant
Dollars

6
2.25%
$22.47

7
2.58%
$25.76

8
2.89%
$28.93

9
3.20%
$31.99

10
3.49%
$34.94

Years
% Grant
Dollars

12
4.05%
$40.53

15
4.82%
$48.19

20
5.92%
$59.24

25
6.85%
$68.46

30
7.61%
$76.14

The entries in Table 2 represent the tax saving from using an S ESOP
over direct ownership in the S corporation. Those numbers can also be used
to estimate the increase in an acquirer’s possible bid price that is a result of
the tax benefits of using an S ESOP. In the case of a firm that is 100 percent
owned by an S ESOP, the numbers in Table 2 represent the percentage

115 The present value as of the beginning of the ESOP of one dollar to be received at

the end of the ESOP with certainty is $[1/(1+r)n].
116 That is because r / (1+r)n increases with the time to withdrawal (n).
117 I chose a low-risk, one-year interest rate in the range between the higher rates
prevailing in the middle of 2007, when the Tribune deal was announced, and the lower
rates prevailing in the middle of 2008, when a working version of this Article was posted
on SSRN.
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increase in possible bid price. 118 For lesser ownership amounts, the benefit is
roughly the product of the share of the company held through the ESOP and
the relevant value in Table 2. 119
2. Income from Direct Ownership is Current Ordinary Income
(Case 2)
When the income from direct ownership is taxed currently and at
ordinary income tax rates, the effect of holding shares in the S corporation
directly rather than through the S ESOP is equivalent to tying up tp shares of
capital for every share held. That is because holding one share directly has
the same exposure as holding one share through an S ESOP. Accordingly,
the nonparticipating employees must hold as many shares as the ESOP
participants. Thus, the nonparticipating employees must borrow as much as
the ESOP borrows in order to acquire their shares. Their additional salary,
after tax, will pay interest and principal on the base loan, which covers the
cost of (1– tp) shares. Also, the nonparticipating employees’ basis in their
shares will save them tpP0, which will pay the principal on the incremental
loan. Hence, the first tax benefit from using an S ESOP is that the ESOP
participants avoid paying the after-tax interest that the nonparticipating
employees pay on the incremental loan.
As described above, the second tax benefit from holding an interest in an
S corporation through an ESOP when the business generates current income
is that the holder can reinvest the income generated by the corporation
without first having to pay tax on that income. The advantage of such
deferral is that the interest can be reinvested at the before-tax interest rate
instead of the after-tax interest rate. Assuming that the business generates
income at a constant rate, the benefit from using an S ESOP, B, can be
written as:

] [

]

n −1
⎧⎪
(
1 + r (1 − t p )) − 1 ⎫⎪
⎛
1 ⎞
n −1
⎟ + (1 − t p )P0 ⎨ (1 + r ) − 1 −
B = t p P0 ⎜⎜1 −
⎬ (2)
n ⎟
1− tp
⎪⎩
⎪⎭
⎝ (1 + r ) ⎠

[

The first term in equation (2) is the effect of tying up capital in the
incremental loan. The second—complicated and lengthy—term is the
difference between compounding interest on the after-tax income generated
by the S corporation at a before-tax interest rate and at an after-tax interest
rate.
Substituting values for the various terms in equation (2), the present
value from using an S ESOP, rather than directly owning shares in the
S ESOP, is given in Table 3.

118 The calculation assumes that the same parties will own the company either

directly or through the S ESOP or, alternatively, that any holders through the S ESOP
value their interests on the same terms as do outside investors. If the S ESOP holders are
reluctant participants, then the comparison cannot be made.
119 I use the qualifier “roughly” because increases in purchase price result in
increases in basis, which in turn might generate a tax shield that has value to direct
holders.
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Table 3: Tax Benefit from Using an S ESOP over Direct Ownership (As a
function of time to withdrawal from the ESOP) (Assumes income from direct
ownership is current ordinary income) Before-tax Interest Rate of 3.7 percent
Years
% Grant
Dollars

1
1.25%
$12.49

2
2.45%
$24.53

3
3.64%
$36.42

4
4.82%
$48.17

5
5.98%
$59.76

Years
% Grant
Dollars

6
7.12%
$71.21

7
8.25%
$82.52

8
9.37%
$93.69

9
10.47%
$104.72

10
11.56%
$115.61

Years
% Grant
Dollars

12
13.7%
$136.99

15
16.81%
$168.06

20
21.73%
$217.31

25
26.36%
$263.56

30
30.7%
$307.00

The entries in Table 3 are everywhere larger than those in Table 2. That
is not surprising. The tax advantage from using an ESOP is greater if the
income generated by the S corporation would otherwise be taxed currently as
ordinary income rather than deferred and taxed as capital gain.
3. Interest Paid on Loan Outside of the ESOP is Tax-Deductible
The above calculations for the tax benefits of using a leveraged S ESOP
assumed that the nonparticipating employee who synthesized the
participating employee’S ESOP position by purchasing shares and borrowing
on personal account would not be able to deduct her interest payments. That
assumption has some basis in the law—interest on personal loans is not
deductible. 120 However, my main reason for making that assumption is to
mirror the tax treatment of the ESOP loan. As described above, an ESOP is a
tax-efficient investment vehicle because the income earned on assets held in
an ESOP is exempt from tax as long as the assets remain within the ESOP. It
is precisely what makes an ESOP an attractive investment vehicle that also
makes an ESOP an unattractive borrowing vehicle. Interest paid on a loan
incurred through an ESOP is, in effect, not deductible by the borrower.
That observation turns the standard (albeit faulty) logic—that an ESOP is
attractive from a tax standpoint because principal payments can be
deducted—on its head. It suggests that a leveraged ESOP can be an
unattractive borrowing vehicle. An ESOP participant who can borrow on
personal account on the same terms as the ESOP and receive a deduction
against ordinary income is better off borrowing on personal account. Such a
taxpayer gets the best of both systems—investing through an ESOP (or other
qualified account) and borrowing on personal account. 121 In some
circumstances, there are anti-arbitrage provisions that are intended to

120 I.R.C. § 163(h)(2) (2007).
121 Tax-deductible interest includes business interest, investment interest, and home

acquisition interest.
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penalize similar strategies. 122 The well-known problem with such rules is
that money is fungible, which makes them difficult to enforce. 123 However,
even if it is not possible to borrow on personal account and invest through a
qualified account, it might still be possible to borrow in a manner that
generates tax-deductible interest and to hold the asset directly. In that case,
the decision to use a leveraged ESOP involves a trade-off between the tax
advantage of avoiding tax on the income generated by the assets in the ESOP
and the tax disadvantage of losing the interest deduction on the ESOP loan.
Accordingly, in this section, I have calculated the tax benefits from using
an S ESOP assuming that interest paid on the non-ESOP loan would be
deductible. That calculation takes place in two steps. In the first, I recalculate
the tax benefits from an S ESOP over direct ownership assuming that the
interest from the incremental loan (the amount by which the loan without an
ESOP exceeds the loan on the participating employee’s after-tax portion of
the stock with the ESOP) is deductible. 124 Those calculations, which are
made using equation (1) when the S corporation would produce only deferred
long-term capital gain and equation (2) when it would produce only current
ordinary income, assume that only the interest on the incremental loan is
deductible. Accordingly, in the second step, I calculate the additional tax
savings assuming that the interest on the base loan—which covers the cost of
acquiring 65 percent of the shares in the ESOP—is also deductible.
Subtracting the second number from the first gives the tax advantage from
using an S ESOP assuming all interest paid outside of the ESOP is tax
deductible.
After paying taxes at 35 percent, a before-tax interest rate of 3.7 percent
is equivalent to an after-tax interest rate of 2.4 percent. Thus, the after-tax
borrowing cost to a nonparticipating employee is 2.4 percent. Setting r in
equation (1) equal to 2.4 percent gives the present value of the tax advantage
from the S ESOP assuming that all of the income produced by the
S corporation is deferred long-term capital gain and the interest on the
incremental loan—an additional 11.47 percent of shares in the ESOP—is tax
deductible. The results of such an exercise, which recalculates the entries in
Table 2 assuming interest on the incremental loan is tax-deductible, are given
in Table 2A.

122 See I.R.C. § 264(a) (2007) (denying a deduction on loans incurred to pay some

insurance premiums); I.R.C. § 265(a) (2007) (denying a deduction for interest incurred to
buy or acquire tax-exempt securities).
123 The tracing rules are contained in Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T(a) (1997).
124 That recalculation is required not because the tax treatment of the ESOP has
changed—it has not—but because the tax treatment of the counterfactual has changed.
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Table 2A: Tax Benefit from Using an S ESOP over Direct Ownership (As a
function of time to withdrawal from the ESOP) (Assumes income from direct
ownership is deferred capital gain)
Years
% Grant
Dollars

1
0.27%
$2.69

2
0.53%
$5.31

3
0.79%
$7.88

4
1.04%
$10.38

5
1.28%
$12.83

Years
% Grant
Dollars

6
1.52%
$15.21

7
1.75%
$17.55

8
1.98%
$19.82

9
2.2%
$22.05

10
2.42%
$24.22

Years
% Grant
Dollars

12
2.84%
$28.41

15
3.43%
$34.34

20
4.33%
$43.32

25
5.13%
$51.31

30
5.84%
$58.40

Not surprisingly, as a quick comparison of Tables 2 and 2A illustrates,
the tax benefit of using an S ESOP is smaller when interest on the
incremental loan is otherwise tax-deductible.
Similarly, equation (2) gives the tax benefit from using an S ESOP when
all of the income produced by the S corporation is current ordinary income.
Setting r in that equation equal to 2.4 percent gives the present value of the
tax advantage from the S ESOP assuming that the interest on the incremental
loan—an additional 35 percent of shares in the ESOP—is tax deductible. The
results, which recalculate the entries in Table 3 assuming interest on the
incremental loan is tax-deductible, are given in Table 3A.
Table 3A: Tax Benefit from Using an S ESOP over Direct Ownership (As a
function of time to withdrawal from the ESOP) (Assumes income from direct
ownership is current ordinary income)
Years
% Grant
Dollars

1
0.81%
$8.12

2
1.58%
$15.84

3
2.35%
$23.47

4
3.1%
$31.01

5
3.84%
$38.45

Years
% Grant
Dollars

6
4.58%
$45.80

7
5.31%
$53.05

8
6.02%
$60.22

9
6.73%
$67.29

10
7.43%
$74.28

Years
% Grant
Dollars

12
8.8%
$87.99

15
10.79%
$107.93

20
13.95%
$139.53

25
16.92%
$169.20

30
19.71%
$197.07

Once again, a quick comparison of Tables 3 and 3A demonstrates that
the benefit of using an S ESOP is smaller when interest on the incremental
loan would otherwise be tax-deductible.
Tables 2A and 3A give the tax advantage from an S ESOP over direct
ownership of the S corporation assuming that the interest on the incremental
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loan is deductible by the direct owner. Those calculations also assume that
the interest on the base loan—65 percent of shares in the S ESOP—is not
deductible by the direct owner. I made that assumption when I originally
presented the tables so as to keep the same treatment of interest outside of the
ESOP as within the ESOP. If, however, the interest on the incremental loan
is deductible, presumably the interest on the base loan is deductible as well.
In that case, the interest deductions from the base loan further reduce the tax
benefit from holding shares through an S ESOP. Table 4A gives the present
value of the tax deductions from a self-amortizing loan at 3.7 percent that
covers the cost of the base loan—65 percent of the shares in the ESOP—as a
function of the loan term.
Table 4: Tax Benefit from Borrowing with Deductible Interest Rather than
Through an ESOP (As a function of the Loan Term) (Assumes Loan is SelfAmortizing, Constant Payment over Term)
Years
% Grant
Dollars

1
1.26%
$12.62

2
1.89%
$18.89

3
2.55%
$25.55

4
3.21%
$32.12

5
3.88%
$38.78

Years
% Grant
Dollars

6
4.55%
$45.50

7
5.23%
$52.31

8
5.92%
$59.19

9
6.61%
$ 66.15

10
7.32%
$ 73.18

Years
% Grant
Dollars

12
8.37%
$ 83.69

15
9.41%
$ 94.14

20
10.44%
$104.44

25
11.05%
$110.50

30
11.44%
$114.42

Table 4 is not directly comparable to Tables 2A and 3A. The reason is
that Tables 2A and 3A give the value of using an S ESOP as a function of the
time the assets are held in the ESOP. 125 In contrast, Table 4 gives the cost of
borrowing money through an S ESOP (using a level-payment loan) as a
function of the loan term. The tables cannot simply be compared because the
loan term might not be the same as the ESOP term. Thus, to use the tables
together, the loan term gives the value from Table 4. That value is then used
with the value generated by either Table 2A or 3A using the ESOP term.
Consider first the case when the S corporation generates deferred capital
gain. When the loan term is ten years, the cost of borrowing through the
ESOP is more than 7 percent of the principal amount of the loan. Looking at
Table 2A, the benefit of investing through an ESOP for 30 years is less than
6 percent. Thus, a participant is generally better off borrowing and
purchasing the shares on personal account when the S corporation stock
generates deferred capital gain and she can borrow on the same terms as the
ESOP and deduct her interest.

125 If the funds withdrawn from the ESOP are rolled over into another qualified
account, then the proper term to use is the total time that the funds are held in qualified
accounts.
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When the S corporation generates current ordinary income, the tax
benefits from investing through an ESOP are roughly equal to the tax cost of
borrowing through the ESOP assuming the loan term equals the time the
assets are held in the ESOP. In the example, the difference in value for a tenyear loan and a ten-year ESOP is less than one tenth of one percent. For
shorter holding periods, the personal account is more tax efficient; for longer
holding periods, the ESOP is more efficient. The amounts, however, are not
large unless the ESOP term is much longer than the loan term. 126
Thus, when interest on a loan outside of the ESOP would be taxdeductible, the tax benefit from using an S ESOP is much less than that given
in the prior section. Depending on the term of the ESOP loan, the mix of
ordinary income and long-term capital gain produced by the S corporation,
and how long the employees will leave their securities in qualified accounts,
there might not be any tax advantage over direct ownership from using an
S ESOP.
E. Caveats in the Estimates
The above calculations generally represent an upper bound for the tax
benefit that can be obtained by using an S ESOP instead of direct ownership
in an S corporation. There are various assumptions buried in those
calculations. Several of those assumptions deserve attention.
First, the extent to which the S ESOP provides the employee with a tax
advantage depends upon whether the S ESOP offsets other holdings in
qualified accounts. If the S ESOP replaces holdings in another qualified
account, then, in general, there is no tax savings. 127 If, however, the ESOP
does not replace other holdings in qualified accounts, but supplements them,
then the participant receives a tax benefit. The benefit of expanding a
qualified account is not unique to ESOPs. There are generally other qualified
accounts that can be used. Moreover, the limits for such accounts are
generally for total contributions to all such accounts; there are not separate

126 The adjustment in Table 4 raises the obvious question: what do we do if the
taxpayer would not otherwise borrow to invest? In that case, do we still use Table 4? The
adjustment in Table 4 reflects the value of an arbitrage opportunity. By borrowing and
deducting interest, an investor can earn an arbitrage profit by investing on the same terms
through a tax-advantaged vehicle. The question becomes: Would or could the investor
take advantage of this opportunity, which can be done either through tax-advantaged
borrowing or by selling fully taxable assets to fund the alternative investment? If the
answer is yes, then the adjustment in Table 4 should be made; otherwise, the adjustment
should not be made. My guess—and this is only a guess—is that the adjustment is
probably appropriate for wealthy and financially sophisticated parties, but not for the vast
majority of ESOP participants.
127 I use the qualifier “in general” because whether there is a tax saving depends on
the relative tax efficiency of the displaced investments in the qualified account. For
example, if the displaced investments would be taxed at 35 percent, and the ESOP assets
would be deferred and taxed at 15 percent, then the S ESOP does not produce a tax
benefit, but has a tax cost. That is because it is more efficient to hold the displaced assets
in a qualified account than the assets that displaced them. In other words, an ESOP is an
efficient vehicle for holding stock of an S corporation that generates current ordinary
income, but it is not as efficient for holding the stock of an S corporation that generates
deferred capital gain.
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limits for each type of account and hence additive. 128 Also, most
beneficiaries of S ESOPs are likely to have excess capacity in their qualified
accounts. Accordingly, the adoption of an S ESOP is unlikely to expand the
capacity of qualified accounts, but at most only to expand the use of such
accounts. 129
Second, the calculation of the tax benefit from using an S ESOP assumes
that if stock in the S corporation were held directly the S corporation would
not produce any tax shelter that flowed through to the holder. To the extent
that there is tax shelter passed through to direct holders of shares in the
S corporation, that is a benefit direct holders enjoy, but which indirect
holders through an S ESOP do not. When such benefits take the form of tax
deferral—generally by accelerating ordinary deductions and recapturing
those deductions at ordinary rates—they reduce the relative benefit from an
S ESOP, but they cannot surpass it. This is because the S ESOP, as a
qualified account, provides the maximum amount of deferral over the period.
However, when the tax shelter takes the form of accelerated deductions
against ordinary income that are recaptured at a reduced long-term capital
gains rate, then it is possible for the benefit of direct ownership to exceed the
benefit of using an S ESOP. 130
Third, the above calculations assume that direct owners can purchase
additional shares on personal account. If the S ESOP owns 100 percent of the
company, then it would not be possible for a participant to purchase more
shares (assuming that the business cannot be scaled up). In that case, it is not
possible for participants to synthesize the increased exposure from directly
holding the stock by making outside purchases. In such circumstances, it
might be more attractive to hold the stock directly rather than through an
ESOP because the holder can obtain greater exposure to the company’s
stock. 131 That option, however, will be attractive only if the owners expect
their stock price to appreciate at a rate greater than the risk-adjusted rate of
return. Thus, an acquirer who thought she was acquiring the corporation at a
discount to its actual value, and who expects the resulting excess return to
take the form of capital gains, might prefer to hold as much of her interest as
possible outside of the ESOP.
A fourth assumption that was used to arrive at the above results is that
the holders of direct interests who pay tax at long-term capital-gain tax rates
do not die while holding those interests, nor do they contribute those interests

128 Also, the contribution limits for S ESOPs are stricter than the limits for some

other qualified accounts inasmuch as dividend payments count towards the limit with S
ESOPs, but not with other qualified accounts.
129 Many S ESOPs own 100 percent of the sponsoring company. Rosen, supra note
76, at i. In such circumstances, all of the company’s income is passed through to the
ESOP and deferred. No portion of an S corporation 100 percent owned by an ESOP is
subject to current taxation. Although such income is not currently taxed, it will be
eventually taxed to participants. Once again, there is no benefit if the S ESOP replaces
another qualified account. If it does not, then the effect is to expand use of qualified
accounts.
130 I also assume that the S corporation does not produce phantom income, which
might occur if the inside basis were lower than the outside basis. I also assume that the
tax treatment of increases and decreases in income are symmetric.
131 A similar situation occurs with restricted stock.
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to charities. 132 The calculations assume that such holders pay capital gain tax
when they sell their shares. If they never pay that tax, either because they die
holding their shares and their heirs receive a step-up in basis, or because they
contribute the shares to charity and can avoid the tax, then the tax
consequences of direct ownership and ownership through an ESOP are the
same. 133
Fifth, the above calculations assume that the income tax does not capture
any portion of the return that compensates for risk. Instead, the calculations
assume that only the risk-free rate of return is captured by any tax. This
assumption is standard in the academic literature—both legal and
economic—but is often met with skepticism by investors and their
advisors. 134 It is also more likely to be true for wealthy and sophisticated
investors than for other investors.
Sixth, the calculations assume that the corporation generates the same
cash flow whether its shares are held directly or through an S ESOP. 135 That
assumption has the advantage of isolating the tax consequences of using an
S ESOP by separating the tax and non-tax consequences of using an S ESOP.
The empirical evidence, however, shows that the adoption of an ESOP leads
to greater productivity and increased cash flow. 136
The above discussion suggests that there is little, if anything, unique
about the tax benefits afforded to S ESOPs and little reason for an
S corporation to adopt an S ESOP solely to obtain tax benefits. Whatever
benefits the S ESOP structure provides will often be available through other
means. Numerous structures provide for pass-through taxation and other
qualified accounts provide for exemption of the return earned on the assets in
an account while they are in a qualified account. Moreover, when an S ESOP
offsets an equally tax-efficient qualified account, there is no net tax benefit
from using an S ESOP. And when it does not offset another qualified
account, then the effect of establishing an S ESOP is simply to expand the
use of such accounts. Also, if the participant could have borrowed on the
same terms on personal account and deducted the interest, then any benefit
from using an S ESOP is likely to be largely (if not entirely) offset by the
additional cost of borrowing through the ESOP.
V. ZELL’S TRIBUNE TRANSACTION
In April 2007, the Tribune, a publicly traded C corporation,
announced that it had agreed to an $8.2 billion buyout offer from a group led
132 An owner cannot contribute shares in an S corporation to a charity without

causing the S corporation to become a C corporation. That is because a charity is not a
permissible holder of S corporation stock. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1).
133 When the S corporation generates current ordinary income, holding the stock
until death or contributing the stock to charity will not avoid tax on any income.
134 See discussion infra nn. 173–79 and accompanying text.
135 Another assumption that is implicit in making the calculations is that the
company would not otherwise be a C corporation, or if it were it would not pay a
substantial amount of tax.
136 The empirical studies regularly find significant and substantial productivity gains
when a company adopts an ESOP. See Freeman, supra note 6 (surveying studies of
ESOPs).
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by Samuel Zell. 137 In December 2007, the buyout was completed, leaving
the Tribune as the largest 100-percent ESOP-owned S corporation 138 and
the fifth-largest majority employee-owned company in the United States. 139
The transaction is complicated. The description below captures the essential
features of that transaction for the discussion that follows.
The acquisition took place in two stages. In the first stage, Zell made a
$250 million investment in the Tribune, the ESOP borrowed $250 million
from the Tribune and purchased nine million shares at $28 a share, and the
Tribune borrowed $7 billion and redeemed shares at $34 a share. 140 Thus,
the ESOP purchased its shares at a substantial discount to Zell. 141
In the second stage, the Tribune converted from a C corporation to an
S corporation. 142 The Tribune then borrowed an additional $3 billion, and it
acquired all outstanding shares not held by the ESOP, leaving the Tribune as
a 100-percent owned S corporation. 143 The Tribune also redeemed Zell’s
initial $250 million investment. 144 Shortly thereafter, Zell made a $315
million investment in the form of a $225 million subordinated note and the
purchase of a warrant for $90 million. 145 The warrant, which can be
exercised anytime within fifteen years of issuance, gives Zell the right to
acquire 40 percent of the Tribune from the ESOP. 146 The exercise price of
the warrant starts at $500 million and increases by $10 million a year until it
reaches $600 million, where it remains until it expires. 147
The transaction has many interesting aspects, but from a tax perspective
what is most interesting is the warrant. 148 The warrant allows Zell to acquire
137 Until approved by the shareholders, the Tribune’s board of directors had an
obligation to consider other bids, but if they accepted another offer, Zell would have
received a $25 million break-up fee. See Seelye & Siklos, supra note 23 (describing the
$25 million break-up fee as relatively low).
138 Tribune Deal Closes: Company to Become the Largest 100% ESOP S-Corp,
OWNERS AT WORK, 3 (Winter 2007/2008).
139 NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, THE EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 100:
AMERICA’S
LARGEST
MAJORITY
EMPLOYEE-OWNED
COMPANIES
(2007),
http://www.nceo.org/library/eo100.html.
140 McIntyre, supra note 1, at 8.
141 Zell had planned for the Tribune to sell some assets, such as the Chicago Cubs,
before converting the Tribune from a C corporation to an S corporation. If assets are sold
within ten years after conversion, the gain on those assets is still subject to corporate level
tax. However, that tax might be avoided if the assets are sold constructively instead of
actually. Robert Willens, Will Tribune Corp. Pay Tax on Asset Divestitures?, BNA
DAILY TAX REP., Feb. 7, 2008, at 25.
142 McIntyre, supra note 1, at 9.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 8.
145 Id. at 9.
146 Id. Zell is also chairman of the Tribune. I ignore any interest he has in the ESOP
as an employee.
147 Id. The effective price of any shares acquired by Zell through the warrant is at
least $34 a share. McIntyre, supra note 1 at 8.
148 According to one estimate, between 15 and 20 percent of S ESOPs use some
form of synthetic equity. Proposed Synthetic Equity Tax, supra note 17, at 3–4 (citing
Loren Rodgers, Director of Research for the National Center for Employee Ownership).
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a 40-percent interest in the Tribune for between $500 million and $600
million. 149 Some press reports suggested that Zell made a very good deal at
the expense of the remaining ESOP participants because he obtained the right
to purchase 40 percent of the Tribune for less than $1 billion. 150 Those
reports, however, ignore the debt on the Tribune, which makes the real
acquisition cost—and the value of the company at which the warrant
becomes worth exercising—much higher than the warrant’s exercise
price. 151
From a tax perspective, what is interesting about the warrant is that it is a
capital asset in Zell’s hands. If Zell held a 40-percent interest in the Tribune
directly, then he would be allocated 40 percent of all income that the Tribune
earned after payment of expenses, including interest, compensation, and
allowances for depreciation and amortization. 152 Accordingly, if the
acquisition was very successful and the Tribune produced large amounts of
current ordinary income that it used to pay down the debt, then 40 percent of
that income would be allocated to Zell. Moreover, Zell would have to pay tax
on that income at the ordinary income tax rate of 35 percent. 153
Alternatively, if the acquisition did not produce large amounts of current
ordinary income, but was still very successful because of the prospect of
large future revenues, Zell could then sell his shares for a profit. That profit
would be taxed as long-term capital gain, which currently has a top tax rate
of 15 percent. 154 Most likely, if Zell held his interest in the Tribune directly,
and if the transaction were a success, he would have a combination of
ordinary income and deferred long-term capital gain.
There are, thus, two tax advantages to Zell from holding his Tribune
interest as an S ESOP derivative rather than as a direct interest in the
S corporation. First, Zell can dispose of his warrant at any time within its 15year life in a manner that will ensure that his entire gain (assuming that there
is a gain) is capital. 155 If Zell held that interest directly, he would likely have
some ordinary income. Thus, the first benefit from the structure is conversion
149 McIntyre, supra note 1, at 8. There are limits on the percentage interest that

anyone can hold of the shares of an S ESOP, either directly or indirectly through a
derivative. The Code calls such derivatives synthetic equity and limits ownership to a 50
percent interest. I.R.C. § 409(p). For a discussion of the § 409(p) rules on prohibited
allocations of securities in S ESOPs, see Kaplan et al., supra note 35, at A-32–A-36;
Carolyn F. Zimmerman, Complying With the Section 409(p) Anti-Abuse Rules, in
S CORPORATION ESOPS 93 (Scott Rodrick ed., 2d ed. 2005).
150 E.g., The Conspiracy to Keep You Poor and Stupid, There’s Never a Financial
Media Around When You Need One, http://www.poorandstupid.com/ (Apr. 6, 2007,
13:28 EST); Jones, supra note 62.
151 The pricing of the shares to the S ESOP and the terms of the warrant ensure that
if Zell exercises his warrant, the participants will earn a higher return than Zell. Oneal
&Rosenthal, supra note 23.
152 The amortization and depreciation allowances are likely to be small relative to
the acquisition price because it is usually optimal to acquire free standing C corporations,
such as the Tribune, using a structure that does not lead to a step up in basis. See Scholes
& Wolfson, supra note 56.
153 See I.R.C. § 1366(a) (pass through of S corporation income to shareholders).
154 S corporation stock is a capital asset under I.R.C. § 1221 and so its sale generates
capital gain or loss under I.R.C. § 1222.
155 Any losses are also likely to be capital.
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of ordinary income into capital gain. Second, the warrant allows Zell to avoid
paying tax on any portion of his gain until he disposes of his interest
(assuming he disposes of that interest within fifteen years). 156 If Zell held
that interest directly, he would likely have some income in earlier years.
Thus, the second benefit is deferral of taxation.
Another feature of the warrant is that it will not have adverse tax
consequences for the ESOP participants. Their withdrawals, which are after
dilution by the warrant (assuming the warrant is exercised), are taxed at
ordinary income tax rates. 157 In effect, the S ESOP blocks the Tribune’s tax
consequences from being passed through to the participants until they
withdraw their assets. 158 Thus, the tax consequences of the warrant are solely
the consequences for Zell: conversion and deferral.
The key tax feature of the warrant is that it is taxed as a capital asset in
Zell’s hands, not as an ownership interest. 159 That treatment is not related to
the warrant’s option element; it would apply as well to a forward contract. 160
Thus, consider a prepaid forward contract that entitles the holder to receive
forty shares at a future date without an additional payment. 161 The cost of
such a forward is 40P0. If such a transaction were respected and taxed
according to its form, then an ESOP participant would be taxed at the same
time as the direct owner assuming that the owner was certain to receive all
his income in the form of deferred capital gain. 162 In order for an ESOP
participant to have the same exposure as the forward contract holder, the
ESOP must contain 52.3 shares. 163 The after-tax cost to the ESOP participant
of such shares is 34P0. 164 Once again, the cost of the direct or derivative
purchase is 6P0 more than the after-tax cost of acquiring the economically
equivalent position through an ESOP. However, the direct or derivative
purchase produces a basis of 40P0, which, in turn, produces a tax saving of
6P0. 165 That saving will pay off the principal, but not the interest, on the loan
used to purchase the prepaid forward. Thus, the benefit from using an ESOP
instead of a derivative contract is the interest paid on the amount of capital
(unproductively) tied up by making a direct or derivative purchase instead of
acquiring the position through an ESOP. 166 In other words, the tax

156 McIntyre, supra note 1, at 9.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Options and warrants both meet the definition of a capital asset under I.R.C.

§ 1221.
161 I assume the stock does not pay dividends.
162 Both would be taxed at 15 percent and so on an after-tax basis would receive the

appreciation on thirty-four shares.
163 That is calculated as 34 shares / (1 - .35).
164 That is calculated as 52.3 shares × (1 - .35) × P .
0
165 Because all income is capital gain, the basis produces a saving at the 15 percent
capital gains rate.
166 The text assumes that either the direct purchase is funded out of cash that would
otherwise be invested in a manner that generates ordinary interest income or the interest
paid on any borrowing is not deductible.
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consequences of holding a derivative on an S ESOP are not as attractive as
those of holding the economically equivalent position through an S ESOP.
More generally, the tax advantage of holding an interest through an
S ESOP rather than through a derivative upon shares in the ESOP is given by
equation (1). Accordingly, Table 2 gives the advantage from an S ESOP as a
function of how long the assets are held in the ESOP. That advantage does
not depend upon whether the income is current ordinary income or deferred
capital gain. That is because the ESOP blocks the income from passing
through, whether the interest is held through the ESOP or in the form of a
derivative on the shares in the ESOP.
Returning to the Tribune transaction, Zell could not have acquired his
interest through an ESOP, nor could he have acquired it through another
qualified account. 167 Thus, Zell was left with the choice between holding his
interest in the Tribune directly or through an ESOP derivative.
The advantage of the derivative is that it treats all income— whether
current and ordinary or deferred and capital—as deferred capital gain. 168
Accordingly, the two structures yield the same tax result when all of the
income is deferred capital gain. If, however, all of the income is current and
ordinary, then the tax benefit from the S ESOP structure is given by the
difference between equations (2) and (1). In those circumstances, the benefit
generated by holding an interest in the form of a derivative on the S ESOP
rather than holding shares in the S corporation directly is given by the
following equation:
B=

⎧⎪
⎡ (1 + r (1 − t p ))n −1 − 1⎤ ⎫⎪
t p − tcg ⎡
1 ⎤
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[

]

Equation (3) is an upper bound for the tax benefit of synthetic equity
because it assumes all of the income generated by the S corporation would be
taxed currently as ordinary income if the shares were held directly.
In Table 5, I use equation (3) to calculate the value of holding shares
through an S ESOP derivative over holding such shares directly (assuming
interest payments are deductible).

167 In an interview, Zell emphasized that, as chairman, he is also a Tribune

employee and holds an interest through the ESOP. See Phil Rosenthal et al., On the
Future, Dealmaking and Bad Press, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 4, 2007, at C1. That interest,
however, is very small in comparison with his warrant.
168 Tax Reduction and Control Act, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. § 409B (2007). Section
3701 of H.R. 3970 would add § 409B to the Internal Revenue Code. That provision
would tax holders of synthetic equity as if they owned the underlying equity directly.
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Table 5: Tax Benefit from Using an S ESOP Derivative over Direct Ownership
(As a function of time to withdrawal from the ESOP) (Assumes income from direct
ownership is current ordinary income)
Years
% Grant
Dollars

1
0.84%
$ 8.40

2
1.65%
$16.49

3
2.46%
$24.58

4
3.27%
$32.65

5
4.07%
$40.71

Years
% Grant
Dollars

6
4.87%
$48.75

7
5.68%
$56.77

8
6.48%
$64.76

9
7.27%
$72.73

10
8.07%
$80.67

Years
% Grant
Dollars

12
9.65%
$96.45

15
11.99%
$119.86

20
15.81%
$158.07

25
19.51%
$195.11

30
23.09%
$230.86

Equation (3) and Table 5 can be used to estimate an upper bound for
Zell’s tax saving from the structure. The tax saving from the warrant is
roughly that of a straight 40-percent interest in the ESOP if held as a
derivative. Assume such an interest would be worth $100 million. 169 At
most, then, the derivative would save Zell taxes worth 12 percent of the value
of his interest, or about $10 million. That assumes that the warrant is held for
fifteen years before exercise and all of the income from direct ownership
takes the form of currently taxed ordinary income earned ratably over the
fifteen-year period, plus reinvestment in bonds. Although the tax saving is a
large amount of money standing on its own, it is only a small portion—less
than one percent—of the total acquisition cost of the Tribune. Thus, the tax
advantages of the structure would have allowed Zell to raise his bid for the
Tribune by less than one percent.
Once again, it is important to recognize the assumptions under which the
calculations in Table 5 were made. They include the following:
(i)
(ii)

there is no qualified account available;
the investor can borrow at the same interest rate as the ESOP and
can generate a tax deduction on that borrowing;
(iii) there is effectively no taxation of the return to risk bearing;
(iv) all income is current and ordinary;
(v) the asset does not generate any tax shelter (symmetry of tax
treatment); and
(vi) the S corporation generates the same cash flow with or without an
S ESOP. 170
The first assumption is reasonable to make for Zell, as is the second. He
is very likely to be able to borrow on the same terms as the ESOP and deduct
his interest. However, the ESOP will borrow very little—about 3 percent of
169 Zell paid $90 million for the warrant, presumably market value for that interest.

McIntyre, supra note 20, at 1.
170 Another assumption in the calculations is that the company would not otherwise
be a C corporation, or if it were, it would not pay a substantial amount of tax.
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the Tribune’s debt. 171 Thus, the effect of the assumption that interest on
Zell’s share of the ESOP loan would be deductible by Zell if he borrowed the
money himself is small.
The third assumption, however, is the key. According to Merrill Lynch’s
projections, the Tribune will generate free cash flow, after accounting for
capital spending, of close to $300 million in 2008, rising to over $500 million
by 2012. 172 If Zell were the direct owner of a 40 percent stake in the Tribune,
and if such cash flow were realized, then 40 percent of that cash flow would
be taxable to Zell each year. However, with the S ESOP derivative, Zell is
taxed at capital gains rates on that return when he sells his stake. If the
Tribune were to generate $300 million a year in free cash flow that it used to
pay down its debt, then Zell would receive 40 percent of the benefit, or $120
million a year. If Zell held his interest directly, that income would be
allocated to him for inclusion on his annual tax return. His tax, at a 35
percent tax rate, is $42 million a year. Over ten years, say, his tax from the
Tribune paying down its debt would total $420 million, with a present value
of $345.8 million. 173 In contrast with direct ownership, the warrant converts
that income into capital gain. Thus, Zell’s tax bill from the Tribune paying
down $3 billion in debt—$1.2 billion of which is Zell’s share—is $180
million. Moreover, because Zell pays that tax when he sells the warrant,
assumed to be ten years after its acquisition, the present value of that tax is
only $125.2 million. In such circumstances, the warrant would appear to save
Zell $220 million in taxes over direct ownership.
Yet it is questionable whether there is such a large tax benefit from the
structure. The Tribune was sold at auction at a substantial premium. No one
has suggested that the total purchase price paid by Zell, which includes the
debt assumed, was below the market price. There does not appear to be
money left on the table by the Zell group. That suggests that if there is a
reasonable expectation of such a cash flow on such a small equity investment
it must be because of the high level of risk assumed by Zell. That there is an
incremental return to risk-bearing is well documented in the economic
literature. 174 The question is whether the tax system captures that return.
More than sixty years ago, Evsey Domar and Richard Musgrave
showed that the income tax does not tax the return to risk-bearing as long as
the tax system taxes above and below average returns symmetrically. 175 In
such a case, they show that the taxpayer can eliminate the tax on risk by
borrowing and scaling up her investment in the risky asset by 1/(1–t), where t
is the tax rate on incremental gains and losses. 176
171 The ESOP will borrow $250 million, which is about three percent of the

Tribune’s $8.5 billion borrowing to complete the transaction. McIntyre, supra note 20, at
1.
172 Oneal & Rosenthal, supra note 23.
173 The tax is discounted at the after-tax interest rate of 3.7 percent a year.
174 See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 957–58. In the standard capital asset
pricing model, the return to risk bearing comes from bearing systematic as opposed to
unsystematic risk. See id. at 188–91; STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 284–
87 (7th ed. 2005).
175 See Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation
and Risk Taking, 58 Q.J. ECON. 388 (1944).
176 See id.
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The Domar-Musgrave result has been the source of a large and
growing literature. 177 Although there are some questions as to how well the
result holds in the economy at large, there is generally a consensus that
sophisticated and wealthy taxpayers can and do make the adjustments that
eliminate the tax on the risk premium. 178 Zell is certainly a wealthy and
sophisticated investor. 179 He could offset the tax consequences of the risky
element of his derivative ownership of stock by borrowing and increasing
that interest from 40 percent to 61.5 percent. 180 More simply, instead of
borrowing, he could have taken some part in the $225 million loan he made
to the Tribune and used that money instead to purchase a larger interest in the
Tribune. 181
The point of the exercise above is not the mechanics, but to show
that the claim that the S ESOP creates substantial value because it defers and
converts from ordinary income into capital gain—which is the source of most
of the income he expected to receive—the income Zell would receive as
compensation for taking on risk is questionable. That is because Zell, through
fairly simple adjustments, could have avoided that tax. Thus, the claim that
there are substantial tax benefits to Zell from using the S ESOP structure is
also questionable.
VI. CONCLUSION
I think any reader who has followed me this far will agree that the tax
consequences of S ESOPs are complex. Understanding those consequences
takes more than just reading the law and looking at how one or more
transactions are taxed. It requires consideration of the tax treatment of

177 See generally Lawrence Zelanek, The Sometimes Taxation of the Returns to
Risk-Bearing Under a Progressive Income Tax, 59 SMU L. REV. 879 (2006).
178 Id. at 895. It is irrelevant whether an investor actually makes the adjustment.
What matters is that the investor is taxed symmetrically on gains and losses so that such
investor could offset the effect of the tax by borrowing and purchasing more of the asset.
179 I assume that the Tribune’s debt is not guaranteed by Zell. Thus, if the Tribune
experiences losses, they will only be borne by Zell to the extent of his investment in the
Tribune, which is less than 3 percent of the total acquisition cost. If the Tribune performs
poorly, most of the loss will be borne by the lenders. Thus, there is no large asymmetry
that could cause the Domar-Musgrave result to break down.
180 The mechanics of the offsetting transactions are more complicated than in the
usual Domar-Musgrave example because tax on the interest held through the ESOP
derivative is deferred whereas the tax payments with direct ownership are made over
time, not at once. Simplifying, if Zell held 61.5 percent of the Tribune directly, he would
benefit from every $300 million of free cash flow generated by the Tribune and used to
pay down its debt to the extent of $185 million. On this amount, he would have to pay
$65 million in tax, leaving him with a net benefit of $120 million. That is calculated as
follows: 61.5% = 40% / (1 - .35). That is the same $120 million benefit he would receive
if each year the Tribune paid down $300 million of its debt as projected by Merrill
Lynch.
181 Zell’s loan to the Tribune is subordinated to $8.5 billion in other loans. In effect,
Zell is at risk for the entire equity investment, because his loan funds the ESOP share
purchase, but he does not get all of the benefits, because the other ESOP beneficiaries
receive 60 percent of the shares and are guaranteed to receive a higher return than is Zell.
See McIntyre, supra note 1, at 9.
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alternative structures and careful separation of the tax and non-tax
consequences to all parties of using an S ESOP.
Once alternative structures are considered, the claim that there are
substantial and unique tax advantages from using an S ESOP is questionable.
The most common argument—that the S ESOP structure allows employers to
deduct principal on loan repayments—is mistaken. Deducting repayment of
the principal on the ESOP loan is not a source of tax advantage; it is simply
the deduction by an employer of compensation paid to an employee in the
form of paying off an obligation of the employee.
However, a second claim—that the S ESOP allows participants to defer
their income—is true. In effect, the ESOP exempts the return on the assets
contributed to the ESOP over the life of the ESOP. Although the S ESOP
structure has that desirable characteristic, it is not unique in providing that
benefit. Other structures, most notably other qualified accounts, provide that
same benefit. Moreover, because the contribution limits on such accounts are
not separate for each type of account, but instead there is a single limit for
contributions to all of a beneficiary’s qualified accounts together, the use of
an S ESOP does not expand access to such accounts; at most it only expands
their use.
Accordingly, in many circumstances, there will not be a substantial tax
benefit from using an S ESOP. First, if the S ESOP displaces other qualified
accounts, the effect is essentially a wash. 182 Second, if the S ESOP
participants can borrow on the same terms as the ESOP and deduct their
interest payments, then there is also a cost from using a leveraged S ESOP.
The participants, in effect, lose their interest deductions on the loan incurred
through the ESOP as compared with borrowing outside of the ESOP and
making an upfront contribution to an ESOP or another qualified account. In
some circumstances, the tax cost from the lost interest deductions will equal
or exceed the tax benefits from holding assets inside of an S ESOP. The tax
cost to the owner of borrowing through an S ESOP (relative to the benefits of
holding the purchased assets through an S ESOP) is larger the higher the
leverage, the longer the duration of the loan relative to the duration of the
investment, and the more deferred capital gain and the less current ordinary
income the assets produce.
Third, it is unlikely that a sophisticated buyer, such as Zell, would realize
a substantial tax benefit from holding a synthetic interest in an S ESOP rather
than a direct interest in an S corporation. That is because he can eliminate the
tax he would pay on that portion of his income that is a return for bearing
risk with a direct interest in the S corporation by engaging in offsetting
portfolio transactions. 183
182 The offset, however, will not always be equal even if the S ESOP displaces an

equal amount of investment in other qualified accounts. That is because assets that
produce current ordinary income are taxed more heavily than those that produce deferred
capital gain. Accordingly, the tax benefit from holding the former in a qualified account
is greater than the tax benefit from holding the latter. It thus follows that a company that
produces a large amount of current ordinary income is a better candidate for an S ESOP
than one that produces less current ordinary income and more deferred capital gain.
183 Thus, the tax benefit from holding an interest through an S ESOP derivative
rather than directly in an S corporation or other pass through entity is that the holder’s
ordinary return is taxed as deferred long-term capital gain. To the extent that a direct
interest will produce ordinary income instead of long-term capital gain or accelerate
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At the end of the day, there can be a tax benefit from use of the S ESOP
structure (with or without synthetic equity) rather than from direct
ownership, but often there will be little, if any tax benefit from using an
S ESOP relative to the tax benefits that can be achieved from using other
feasible and readily available structures. Moreover, when there are tax
benefits from using an S ESOP, most of those benefits will likely accrue to
the smaller, less sophisticated investors at whom those benefits are targeted,
and they will not be any greater than the benefits those same investors would
achieve from expanding the use of qualified accounts.
In December 2007, Zell purchased the Tribune using a novel S ESOP
structure. That structure appeared to offer various tax benefits, which led
many sophisticated commentators to opine that the S ESOP structure was the
wave of the future. 184 However, as the analysis above shows, although Zell
might have achieved some tax benefits to Zell from using an S ESOP that he
could not have achieved with another structure, any such benefits were very
small relative to the size of the transaction. Thus, the S ESOP structure
should not have permitted Zell to pay substantially more for the Tribune and
is unlikely to enable future bidders to pay substantially more for other target
companies.
It is, of course, a separate question whether the appearance of connecting
large amounts of ordinary income into long-term capital gain and deferring
tax on that gain led Zell and his advisors to believe there would be large tax
benefits from the S ESOP structure and hence induced him to raise his bid
accordingly. However, as this Article shows, the appearance of those benefits
was only an appearance. There were no large tax advantages from the
structure.

income, there is a tax benefit from using an S ESOP derivative. However, that tax benefit
is only on that portion of the ordinary return on the equity investment that the derivative
defers or recharacterizes.
184 See note 24, supra, and accompanying text.

